

Resolvable Designs Applicable to Cryptographic Authentication Schemes

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Abstract. We consider certain resolvable designs which have application to doubly perfect cartesian authentication schemes. These generalise structures determined by sets of mutually orthogonal latin squares and are related to semi-latin squares and other designs which find application in the design of experiments.

1. Introduction.

Sets of mutually orthogonal latin squares find applications in design of experiments for multifactor experiments (John and Quenouille [4]). They can also be used to construct (optimal) semi-latin squares, known as Trojan squares, which find also application in design of experiments (Bailey [2]).

An orthogonal array (Raghavarao [5]) of strength 2 and index 1 is a $k \times s^2$ matrix with entries from a set of s (≥ 2) elements such that any $2 \times s^2$ submatrix contains each possible 2×1 column vector exactly once. Such an array is equivalent to a set of $k - 2$ mutually orthogonal latin squares. Orthogonal arrays have been used to construct doubly perfect cartesian authentication schemes (Brickell [3]).

When s is a prime power there exist sets of $s - 1$ mutually orthogonal latin squares, and this is the maximum number possible. For s not a prime-power no set of $s - 1$ mutually orthogonal latin squares is known. Interest arises, therefore, in semi-latin squares and doubly perfect cartesian authentication schemes which do not arise from sets of mutually orthogonal latin squares. A semi-latin square arising from a set of k mutually orthogonal latin squares of order s has ks treatments and an authentication scheme arising from such a set has k source states. The problem is to construct semi-latin squares with more treatments and doubly perfect cartesian authentication schemes with more source states than would arise from a set (of maximum size) of mutually orthogonal latin squares.

Brickell [3] has defined an orthogonal multi-array $OMA(k, s; r_1, \dots, r_k)$ as a $s^2 \times k$ matrix $A = (a_{ij})$ whose entries are subsets satisfying:

- (i) a_{ij} is an r_j -subset of the set $\{1, 2, \dots, sr_j\}$;

- (ii) given columns i_1 and i_2 and integers x_1 and x_2 with $1 \leq x_1 \leq sr_{i_1}$ and $1 \leq x_2 \leq sr_{i_2}$ there is exactly one row i such that $x_1 \in a_{ij_1}$ and $x_2 \in a_{ij_2}$.

Thus, an $OMA(k, s; 1, \dots, 1)$ is an orthogonal array.

If A is an $OMA(k, s; 1, 1, r_3, \dots, r_k)$ then column ℓ ($3 \leq \ell \leq k$) of A determines a semi-latin square on sr_ℓ treatments. The entry in row i and column j of the semi-latin square is $a_{m\ell}$ where $a_{m1} = i$ and $a_{m2} = j$. Superposing (see Baily [2]) two or more of these semi-latin squares provides other semi-latin squares.

As there do not exist a pair of orthogonal latin squares of order 6 there does not exist an $OMA(4, 6; 1, 1, 1, 1)$. However, the following example (Brickell [3]) is an $OMA(4, 6; 1, 1, 1, 2)$.

Example 1.

1	1	1	1, 2
1	2	2	3, 4
1	3	3	5, 6
1	4	4	7, 8
1	5	5	9, 10
1	6	6	11, 12
2	1	1	9, 11
2	2	1	5, 7
2	3	6	1, 10
2	4	5	2, 12
2	5	3	3, 8
2	6	4	4, 6
3	1	3	7, 12
3	2	6	2, 8
3	3	1	4, 9
3	4	2	6, 10
3	5	4	1, 11
3	6	5	3, 5
4	1	4	5, 10
4	2	5	1, 6
4	3	2	8, 12
4	4	1	3, 11
4	5	6	4, 7
4	6	3	2, 9
5	1	5	4, 8
5	2	3	10, 11
5	3	4	2, 3

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 Brickell [3])

5	4	6	5,9
5	5	1	6,12
5	6	2	1,7
6	1	6	3,6
6	2	4	9,12
6	3	5	7,11
6	4	3	1,4
6	5	2	2,5
6	6	1	8,10

Rows 3 and 4 determine semi-latin squares.

1	2	3	4	5	6
2	1	6	5	3	4
3	6	1	2	4	5
4	5	2	1	6	3
5	3	4	6	1	2
6	4	5	3	2	1

1,2	3,4	5,6	7,8	9,10	11,12
9,11	5,7	1,10	2,12	3,8	4,6
7,12	2,8	4,9	6,10	1,11	3,5
5,10	1,6	8,12	3,11	4,7	2,9
4,8	10,11	2,3	5,9	6,12	1,7
3,6	9,12	7,11	1,4	2,5	8,10

whose superposing provides the following semi-latin square on 18 treatments (re-
 placing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of the first square with a, b, c, d, e, f):

$a, 1, 2$	$b, 3, 4$	$c, 5, 6$	$d, 7, 8$	$e, 9, 10$	$f, 11, 12$
$b, 9, 11$	$a, 5, 7$	$f, 1, 10$	$e, 2, 12$	$c, 3, 8$	$d, 4, 6$
$c, 7, 12$	$f, 2, 8$	$a, 4, 9$	$b, 6, 10$	$d, 1, 11$	$e, 3, 5$
$d, 5, 10$	$e, 1, 6$	$b, 8, 12$	$a, 3, 11$	$f, 4, 7$	$c, 2, 9$
$e, 4, 8$	$c, 10, 11$	$d, 2, 3$	$f, 5, 9$	$a, 6, 12$	$b, 1, 7$
$f, 3, 6$	$d, 9, 12$	$e, 7, 11$	$c, 1, 4$	$b, 2, 5$	$a, 8, 10$

2. Resolvable designs.

An $OMA(k, s; r_1, \dots, r_k)$ corresponds to a block design on s^2 points and $s(r_1 + \dots + r_k)$ blocks. The blocks are partitioned into k classes C_1, \dots, C_k where C_i contains sr_i blocks. The s^2 points correspond to the s^2 rows of A and the sr_i blocks of class C_i correspond to the sr_i elements appearing in column i . The block corresponding to element ℓ in column j is incident with the point corresponding to row i if and only if $\ell \in a_{ij}$.

The design D has s^2 points, kr blocks where $r = r_1 + \dots + r_k$, each block contains k points, and each point belongs to r blocks. The blocks are partitioned

into k classes C_1, \dots, C_k such that each point is incident with r_i blocks of C_i . Such a partition of the blocks is called a resolution of the design D . If $r_1 = \dots = r_k = \alpha$ then the design is α -resolvable as defined by Shrikhande and Raghavarao [7].

This resolvable design has an extra property: any two blocks from distinct classes are incident with exactly one common point. In terms of the semi-latin squares associated with an OMA, this property means that in a square obtained by superposing, treatments from different squares will have concurrence 1. Thus, as discussed by Baily [2], since it seems likely that the most efficient semi-latin squares have concurrences 0 and 1, the efficiency of the superposed semi-latin square will be highly dependent on the concurrences and efficiencies of the component semi-latin squares. If the only concurrences are 0 and 1 then in the corresponding resolvable design two blocks from distinct classes meet in 1 point and two blocks from the same class meet in 0 or 1 point. Anthony *et al* [1] discuss a generalisation of an OMA which also provides doubly perfect cartesian authentication schemes. Such a generalisation also corresponds to a block design for which there is a partition of the blocks. However, this partition need not be a resolution as the condition on the blocks within a class is relaxed. No longer is it required that each point be incident with a fixed number r_i of blocks of class C_i , but only that each point be incident with at least one block of each class. The requirement that two blocks from different classes meet in exactly one point is also relaxed to the requirement that two blocks from different classes meet in at most one point. If such a block design contains two classes each containing k blocks then the remaining classes determine irregular semi-latin squares (Bailey [2]) whose rows and columns are indexed by the blocks of these two special classes.

The array (Anthony *et al* [1]) given in Example 2 determines a doubly perfect cartesian authentication scheme.

3. Authentication designs.

A block design is a triple (P, B, I) where P is a set of points, B is a set of blocks and $I \subseteq P \times B$ is an incidence relation between them. We define an Authentication Design $AD(n, t)$ to be a block design (P, B, I) with n^2 points P and n points per block together with a partition of the blocks B into classes C_1, \dots, C_t such that:

- (i) every point belongs to at least one block of each class;
- (ii) two blocks from different classes meet in at most one point.

If S is an $AD(n, t)$ satisfying the stronger condition

- (i') for each class C_i there is an integer r_i such that every point belongs to r_i blocks of C_i ;
- (ii') then S is called resolvable and we say S is a $RAD(n, t; r_1, \dots, r_t)$.

If S is a $RAD(n, t; r_1, \dots, r_t)$ then two blocks from different classes meet in exactly one point. (The n points of a block of class C_i are each incident with

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r_j distinct blocks of class C_j and so account for all the nr_j blocks of C_j .) A $RAD(n, t; r_1, \dots, r_t)$ is equivalent to an $OMA(n, t; r_1, \dots, r_t)$. If $r_1 = r_2 = 1$, it is equivalent to a collection of semi-latin squares.

Lemma 1. *Let S be an $AD(n, t)$. Then $t \leq n + 1$. If $t = n + 1$ then S is an $RAD(n, n + 1; 1, \dots, 1)$.*

Proof: Let P be a point of S . P is incident with at least one block of each class. Let x_1, \dots, x_t be blocks incident with P and belonging to distinct classes. Any two of x_1, \dots, x_t meet only in P . Thus, the points incident with x_1, \dots, x_t account for $1 + t(n - 1)$ points of S . Thus, $1 + t(n - 1) \leq n^2$, that is, $t \leq n + 1$. If $t = n + 1$ then x_1 is the only block of C_1 incident with P . It follows that each point is incident with exactly one block of each class. ■

The bound of the lemma is obtained only when there exist a set of $n + 1$ mutually orthogonal latin squares. Such sets are known only when n is a prime power. When n is not a prime power the following product construction (analogous to results on latin squares and orthogonal arrays) provides examples.

Example 2.

1	1	1	1,7
1	2	2	2
1	3	3	5
1	4	4	6
1	5	5	3
1	6	6	4,8
2	1	2	6
2	2	3	1,8
2	3	6	3
2	4	1	2
2	5	4	4,7
2	6	5	5
3	1	3	3
3	2	6	6
3	3	2	4,7
3	4	5	1,8
3	5	1	5
3	6	4	2
4	1	4	8
4	2	1	4
4	3	5	2,6
4	4	2	3,5
4	5	6	1
4	6	3	7
5	1	5	4

5	2	4	3,5
5	3	1	8
5	4	6	7
5	5	3	2,6
5	6	2	1
6	1	6	2,5
6	2	4	7
6	3	5	1
6	4	3	4
6	5	2	8
6	6	1	3,8

The fourth column determines the following irregular semi-latin square:

1,7	2	5	6	3	4,8
6	1,8	3	2	4,7	5
3	6	4,7	1,8	5	2
8	4	2,6	3,5	1	7
4	3,5	8	7	2,6	1
2,5	7	1	4	8	3,6

Theorem 1. Let S be an $AD(n_1, t_1)$ with classes C_1, \dots, C_{t_1} and $S_2 = (P, B, I)$ be an $AD(n_2, t_2)$ with classes C'_1, \dots, C'_{t_2} . Put $t = \min(t_1, t_2)$. Define a design $S = (P_1 \times P_2, B, I)$ where $B = C_1 \times C'_1 \cup \dots \cup C_t \times C'_t$ and $(P, Q) \in (x, y)$ if and only if $P \in x$ and $Q \in y$. Then S is an $AD(n_1 n_2, t)$. If S_1 is an $RAD(n_1, t; r_1, \dots, r_{t_1})$ and S'' is an $RAD(n_2, t_2; r'_1, \dots, r'_{t_2})$ then S is an $RAD(n_1 n_2, t; r_1 r'_1, \dots, r_t r'_t)$.

Proof: Clearly, S has $(n_1 n_2)^2$ points and any block (x, y) of S is incident with the $n_1 n_2$ points (P, Q) where $P \in x$ and $Q \in y$. We show that S is an $AD(n_1 n_2, t)$ with classes $C_1 \times C'_1, \dots, C_t \times C'_t$. Let (P, Q) be any point of S . For each i , P belongs to at least one block x of C_i and Q belongs to at least one block y of C'_i . Thus, (P, Q) belongs to at least one block (x, y) of $C_i \times C'_i$. Any block $(x_i, y_i) \in C_i \times C'_i$ meets a block $(x_j, y_j) \in C_j \times C'_j$ in a point (P, Q) such that $P \in x_i, P \in x_j$ and $Q \in y_i, Q \in y_j$. Since there is at most one such P and at most one such Q , (x_i, y_i) and (x_j, y_j) meet in at most one point.

If S_1 and S_2 are resolvable then any point P of S_1 is incident with r_i blocks of C_i and any point Q of S_2 is incident with r'_i blocks of C'_i . Thus, (P, Q) is incident with $r_i r'_i$ blocks of $C_i \times C'_i$ and S is resolvable. ■

Generalised Bhaskar Rao Designs or GBRD's (Seberry [6]) also determine authentication designs. Let G be a group of order g and let A be a $GBRD(v, v, g; G)$. $A = (a_{ij})$ is a $v \times g$ array whose columns are labelled by the g elements of G and whose entries come from G , such that, for all $i \neq j$, the elements $a_{i\ell} a_{j\ell}^{-1}$ ($\ell \in G$)

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Example 3

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constitute the g elements of G . Define a $RAD(g, v + 1; 1, \dots, 1)$ $S = (P, B, I)$ as follows.

$$P = G \times G$$

$$B = \{[h, i] \mid h \in G, 0 \leq i \leq v\}$$

Incidence is determined by:

- block $[h, 0]$ is incident with the points $\{(h, x) \mid x \in G\}$
- block $[h, i] (i \neq 0)$ is incident with the points $\{(\ell, x) \mid \ell \in G, x a_{i\ell} = h\}$.

The sets $C_i = \{[h, i] \mid h \in G\}$ partition the blocks and every point belongs to exactly one block of each of these classes. Furthermore, blocks from distinct classes meet in exactly one point.

A skew symmetric Room square of side r determines a semi-latin square of order r on $2r$ treatments. This corresponds to an $RAD(r, 3; 1, 1, 2)$. A skew symmetric Room square of side r exists for all odd $r \neq 3, 5$ (Stinson [8]). A Room square of side r is an $r \times r$ array such that each cell either is empty or contains two elements from the set $\{0, 1, \dots, r\}$ and such that every element appears exactly once in each row and each column and every pair of elements appears exactly once in the array. A Room square is skew symmetric if every diagonal cell contains 0, and for $i \neq j$ the i, j cell is empty if and only if the j, i cell is not empty.

Let R be a skew symmetric Room square of side r . Let R_0 be obtained from R by removing the symbol 0. Let R'_0 be obtained from R_0 by replacing $1, 2, \dots, r$ with a, b, \dots, g and let R_0^T be the transpose of R'_0 . Then the superposition of R_0 and R_0^T is a semi-latin square.

Example 3. The following is a skew symmetric Room square of side 7,

01	--	45	67	--	--	23
57	02	--	--	--	13	46
--	56	03	12	--	47	--
--	37	--	04	26	--	15
36	14	27	--	05	--	--
24	--	--	35	17	06	--
--	--	16	--	34	25	07

and determines the following semi-latin square.

a1	eg	45	67	cf	bd	23
57	b2	ef	cg	ad	13	46
de	56	c3	12	bg	47	af
fg	37	ab	d4	26	ce	15
36	14	27	bf	e5	ag	cd
24	ac	dg	35	17	f6	be
bc	df	16	ae	34	25	g7

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