

Anatomy of an Occupation: The Indonesian Military in West Papua



Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb-Gannon with Peter King

A report prepared for the West Papua Project at
the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,
The University of Sydney, August 2011



Note on cover images: These images are taken from the document *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists* analysed in this report. The figure marked with an “x” on the left is, according to the *Anatomy*, TPN member Alex Makabori. The murdered person shown in the photograph on the right is identified in the *Anatomy* as either Petrus Tabuni, or someone from Tabuni’s TPN command.

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies



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Executive Summary

This report deals with a series of Indonesian military documents that were passed to the West Papua Project (WPP) in early 2011.¹ The documents provide remarkable insights into how the Indonesian military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* – TNI), operates within the disputed territory of West Papua (disputed, that is, between the vast majority of Papuans and the Indonesian government), and how they view West Papuan civil society. The documents reveal the names and activities of Indonesian intelligence agents; describe how traditional Papuan communities are monitored; and include a detailed analysis of both the West Papuan armed guerrilla groups and the non-violent civil society organisations which promote self-determination. Identifying so many West Papuan leaders and others as “separatists”, these documents effectively show that support for independence is widespread and surprisingly well organised. West Papuans have long complained of living under an Indonesian military “occupation” and these documents go a long way to substantiating this claim.

The authors of this report have sought to verify information contained in the documents where possible. Much of this information on individuals and Papuan organisations is already well known, although presented here more comprehensively in some respects than ever before. We can therefore be relatively confident that the documents are not fabricated or deliberately misleading, although they do contain inaccuracies, omissions and many obvious examples of false or misleading precision. Names of Indonesian intelligence agents, both Papuan and non-Papuan, are impossible to verify and have been left out of our report. We do believe, however, that the general *modus operandi* revealed in the documents is a fair representation of how the Indonesian military operates. As many diverse and disputed claims are made about the conflict in West Papua by the Indonesian and other governments, by international commentators and by the Papuans themselves, we believe that this information should be in the public sphere to increase understanding of this little-known, but intense, bitter and long-standing conflict.

The report is split into two sections. The first deals with the 97 slide PowerPoint presentation entitled, *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*. The presentation itself can be viewed at http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/research/west_papua_project.shtml. This section acts as a running commentary on the slide show, explaining and contextualising what is an intriguing exposition of the West Papuan armed liberation movement and its non-violent civilian counterpart. The forensic details of the *Anatomy* leave the reader in no doubt as to the level of military scrutiny under which the Papuans live. It shows just how seriously the

¹ The West Papua Project, at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Sydney, has operated since 2000 as an academic think tank and research center examining the conflict in West Papua between the indigenous Melanesian people and the Indonesian state and its security forces. During this period the WPP has held many conferences, workshops and briefings, and its affiliates have produced a wide range of publications including books, scholarly articles and reports.

Indonesian forces take the threat of “separatism”, especially its attempts to reach out to an international audience. The presentation could accurately be renamed as an *Anatomy of the Papuan Occupation*.

The second section deals with an assortment of other leaked documents that flesh out the day-to-day reality of living under Indonesian occupation. In both images and text the daily tasks of security force members are outlined as they maintain a close surveillance on communities of traditional Papuans. Details of Indonesian agents - who they are, where they work, what information they can provide - are listed as small links in the heavy chain mesh of an occupation which has at its core the modern practice of “psychological warfare”, PSYOPS. This pernicious system of social control has created a pervasive atmosphere of terror amongst the Papuan population as their lives are manipulated by state actions and threatened with “black operations”. Unsolved, indeed uninvestigated, killings, beatings and rapes occur against a background of a rapidly changing demography as hundreds of thousands of non-Papuan Indonesians move into the province. Predominantly Muslim, the newcomers are adding another layer of tension and fear, as the Muslim-Christian divide widens – taking its cue from the threatened growth of radical Islam in Java and elsewhere.

PSYOPS, as practiced in West Papua, is analysed initially from a general perspective and then from the personal experience of several individual Papuans. As a tool of social control it has been effective in dividing the Papuan people, some of whom now form a Papuan elite that has prospered economically under the bureaucratic “reforms” enacted by the Indonesian government, particularly the creation of two provinces and some 23 new administrative regencies in Papua. However, these documents show that, despite PSYOPS and divide-and-rule administrative policies, there is a high degree of cohesion and unity amongst the West Papuan nationalist majority. Indeed, looking at the Papuan individuals identified in these documents it can be seen that West Papuan nationalism is spread throughout civil society, in the churches, youth groups, customary bodies and political organisations. Far from the desire for self-determination dying out, the younger generation of Papuan leaders is now stridently demanding the rights to which they are entitled by Indonesian law, albeit increasingly as a non-violent, civil resistance movement.

These documents show that Indonesian rule over West Papua can be characterised as an ongoing military/police occupation. Inevitably this involves the systematic infliction of human rights abuses on a civilian population. Our report concludes that Australia should not be co-operating as it does with the TNI elite special forces, *Kopassus*, because it directly implicates the Australian army and taxpayer in the suffering of the Papuan people. And all Australian military aid to Indonesia should be seriously reconsidered while the military dominated system of occupation persists in Papua. The political and administrative reforms that have benefited so much of Indonesia since 1998 need to be properly implemented in West Papua. Until then West Papua will remain a blight on Indonesia’s international reputation and a place of suffering for its indigenous Melanesian population.

Introduction

This report is based on a series of documents recently leaked into the public domain that relate to military and intelligence operations in West Papua.² The most important is entitled *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists* and it gives observers unprecedented insight into how the Indonesian army views the situation there. Organised as a confidential briefing document, presumably for senior Indonesian military, political and government figures, it clarifies a situation that is generally regarded as opaque. Other documents relate to the use of Papuan and non-Papuan intelligence agents by the TNI and efforts by soldiers to socialise with Papuan village communities (these documents are analysed in the second section of this report). While the Indonesian government bans foreign journalists and researchers from Papua's two provinces, now confusingly named Papua and West Papua, in an attempt to block information on the situation from reaching the outside world, here is a case where the Indonesians themselves are providing a frank and comprehensive assessment. While undated, the *Anatomy* document's reference to US President Barack Obama suggests it was written, or at least finished, sometime after his election on November 4, 2008.

Anatomy of Papuan Separatists is an extraordinary document in the form of an extended PowerPoint presentation. Produced by the TNI,³ it is a systematic and detailed analysis of the West Papuan political landscape, mapping who the various actors are and where they fit into a larger picture. Almost every leading West Papuan political and military player is included in this analysis – leaving one with the distinct impression that there is no other game in town except “separatism”. In fact the goal for most of the West Papuan leaders in this analysis is independence, which implies that this is also the desired outcome for the overwhelming majority of the Papuan people. So this document is both a study in “separatism” and a blueprint for a military occupation meant to combat that separatism. Separatism is shown to be not a rare sentiment held by the few, but rather the glue which binds together the West Papuan ethnic and political consciousness. We are given a valuable insight into how West Papua and its Indonesian occupation actually work.

The *Anatomy* file comprises 97 slides and methodically works through the various ways in which the West Papuans confront the Indonesian state. In broad terms the conflict is split between military and political spheres, with some overlap. Both of these spheres are explored in remarkably frank detail. The military analysis of the “separatist” movement is the most detailed ever undertaken, or at least revealed publicly, and shows just how extensive the

² These documents have been referred to in a blog site on the internet dated January 30, 2011 at www.nokenlama.blogspot.com/2011/01/kisah-tentang-kekerasan-seksual.html in an entry entitled “Story About Sexual Violence in West Papua [By] Army Personnel”, which refers to “an article titled *An Anatomy of Separatists in Papua*, [by] Maj. D. Arm Fence”. The article was published by the Secretariat for Justice and Peace, Archdiocese Merauke, Papua. Some others of these documents have been quoted previously (see allannairn.com), although many appear to be new, or at least to have received no public analysis; hence this report.

³ The author of the *Anatomy* document is named as Major Arm Fence D Marani.

armed opposition to Indonesian rule is. The *Anatomy* document provides details of 31 armed groups of the TPN (*Tentara Pembebasan Nasional*—the National Liberation Army), the military wing of the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*—the Free Papua Movement) that are spread right across the two provinces (*Papua* and *Papua Barat*) that constitute the region referred to collectively in this report as West Papua. Rather than being the ragtag bunch of malcontents - which the OPM/TPN are usually portrayed as — this *Anatomy* shows them to be a relatively cohesive and deeply entrenched resistance army, highly committed to achieving their goal of independence from Indonesia, even though the *Anatomy* often seems to imply that all the dozens of groups it identifies across a 40 year period are still functioning pretty much as when first identified.

Before proceeding with analysis of the document we have three general comments.

First, we wish to highlight the pervasiveness of the phenomenon of “separatism” as seen from the (Indonesian military) author’s point of view. Demands for dialogue; the “return” of Special Autonomy to Jakarta, and for demilitarisation, improved human rights, an end to discrimination, economic marginalisation and environmental devastation in West Papua — all amount to only “separatism” in the *Anatomy*. And separatism is viewed as a legitimate thing for the military to attack; separatists are enemies of the Indonesian state, and therefore enemies of the military and the police. There is no attempt to understand where this sentiment comes from, just to identify its existence to be targeted for destruction. That there are so many separatists does not seem to faze the author(s) of the *Anatomy*; just to reinforce his (their) sense of mission.

There is little discussion of those Papuans who are not separatists. There are undoubtedly Papuans who have thrown in their lot with Indonesia, one of whom is identified in the *Anatomy*, Franzalbert Joku. He is the only person of the hundreds listed who has “returned to Indonesia”. Joku is a well-known former independence activist who has given up the struggle as a hopeless cause and works hard to convince other “separatists” to do the same. Later in this report we will explore Joku’s views further as well as those of other prominent Papuans who have eschewed the struggle for freedom.

Second, it is noteworthy that there are so many “separatists” identified in the *Anatomy*, and that they include so many of the most prominent people from the three generations since the Indonesian takeover of Papua in 1962-3 is striking. While most outside observers dismiss the chance of achieving independence as remote if not impossible, given the power and determination of the Indonesian state and the comparative weakness of the Papuans, many Papuans do not. They are fully committed to the struggle. In fact these documents show that the younger generation, those in their 20s and 30s, are as committed as the older generations. Together the Papuans listed in this document represent most of the current leading figures in West Papuan society. The *Anatomy* shows how seriously the Indonesian state and military consider the threat of separatism, and indeed it places the people named

under grave threat of targeted assassination. Some of them have indeed already been killed since the publication of the document (for instance OPM leader Kelly Kwalik). This has led some informed readers of the *Anatomy* to describe it as a “hit list” of people targeted for removal.

Thirdly, this document tells us how the Indonesian military views the West Papuan political structure. To an outside observer it is hard to grasp how all the multiple military, social and political Papuan groups relate to each other. Here this complex situation is laid out with surprising clarity: there are traceable lines of authority and engagement — even between various “factions” and geographically isolated groups. One reason that Jakarta has given for refusing to negotiate with the West Papuans over the myriad problems that beset the province is that “we do not know who to negotiate with”.⁴ This document undermines that pretext.

Section 1: Analysis of *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*

There is no index to the *Anatomy*, but the document can be broken down as follows:

Overview	p.2
Separatist Development	p.5
PEMKA OPM Faction, 20 Groups	p.6
MARVIC OPM Faction, 11 Groups	p.28
Territorial War Commands	p.42
Known Activities of GSP/B	p.42
General Structure of GSP/P	p.45
Structure of Political Organizations	p.46
Papuan Separatists Foreign Networks	p.54
Bio-data and Brief History of Key Papuans	p.63
Known Activities of GSP/P	p.96

⁴ Private conversation with senior Indonesian officials accompanying President Yudhoyono on his visit to Australia, Sydney University, 8 March, 2010.

The document starts with the statement that the situation in Papua is “generally conducive” [for Indonesia] but that “Papuan separatist groups continue to voice their aspirations”.⁵ It goes on to explain what these aspirations are and what constitutes “separatist groups”. Their alleged tactics are to highlight the failure of Special Autonomy in Papua and the injustice of the Act of Free Choice, two of the most significant actions undertaken by the Indonesian government during their period in control of West Papua. The supposed goal of these tactics is to discredit the Indonesian government and demand a referendum on the future of West Papua – or, in the Indonesian military’s words, to achieve the break-up of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Act of Free Choice (AOFC) was a semi-farcical poll taken in 1969 under nominal UN supervision where 1025 handpicked “representatives” of the Papuan people voted unanimously for official inclusion of the former Dutch territory of West New Guinea, by then named Irian Jaya and under Jakarta’s control since 1963, into Indonesia. The AOFC is widely seen by both West Papuans and outside observers as a gross injustice, which robbed the Papuans of their right to self-determination.

Special Autonomy comprises the package of laws and regulations drawn up in 2001 and subsequently whereby the Indonesian government appeared to give certain concessions to the West Papuans as a way of undermining widespread calls for independence. The package was only partially implemented and resulted in no real empowerment of the Papuan people; rather, it accelerated corruption, increased inward migration by Indonesians of Malay descent and served to strengthen the Indonesian military occupation. Special Autonomy was “returned” to Jakarta by the West Papuan people in July 2010 through their representatives in the peak official Papuan political organisation, the MRP (*Majelis Rakyat Papua* — the all-Papuan upper house of the provincial parliament in Papua) but Jakarta has not yet accepted it back.⁶

That the *Anatomy* directly links protest against the fraudulent AOFC and failed Special Autonomy (known by Papuans as *Otsus—Otonomi Khusus*) with Papuan separatism seems to dismiss the possibility of a “middle ground” position. Such a position might encompass the views of Papuans who may be agreeable to living within the Indonesian Republic but are deeply unhappy about the results of *Otsus* and believe that the AOFC should be acknowledged as a charade perpetrated on the Papuan people by the Indonesians with the willing assistance of the United Nations and the international community, particularly the USA. So the tone set for this document is clear from the beginning – it reflects the unambiguous military and nationalist view that all those who dispute the status quo in West Papua are “separatists” – akin to traitors and legitimate enemies of the Indonesian military.

⁵ *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*, p.2

⁶ As of 2011 there are two MRPs – one for each of the two Papuan provinces.

Slide 3 notes that there are 114 TNI military posts along the 760 km border with Papua New Guinea (PNG). This is new information and contrasts starkly with PNG's very poorly policed border region where grossly under-resourced PNG Defence Force posts are maintained only in Vanimo and Daru, the two coastal towns at either end of the long joint border.⁷ This slide also conflates the populations of the two Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, seeing them as containing a single group of (Papuan) people.⁸ This is how most West Papuans, and many outside observers, in fact consider the region — as the historical entity of West Papua. From this we can see that the TNI has the same view.

The following Slide 4 acknowledges that the Papuan people are “easily influenced by separatist ideas” (i.e. that the desire for independence is a widely held one) but attribute this to a “lack of perception of nationality”. Most Papuans are indeed self-perceived Melanesians who cannot identify as Indonesians and feel entitled to their own land on this basis. There is also the acknowledgement that the issue of *Otsus* has sparked debate in Papuan society, “first and foremost, for the separatists”. This shows that the TNI acknowledges once again how widespread support for “separatism” actually is. The slide ends with a peevish comment blaming the Papuans for claiming that “every conflict in the community is always tied to the TNI with the hope that it will grab the attention of the international community”.⁹ This statement is true. The Papuans do tend to blame the TNI or the police for every conflict, but the reality is that the TNI and police do get involved in most conflicts in West Papua, even if they have not caused them. This statement also indicates that the TNI (and the Papuans) are acutely aware of the monitoring eye of the international community.

Separatist Development

Slide 5 provides the basic prism through which the “separatist” struggle is viewed and pursued — on the one hand through armed struggle, and on the other by “political groups”. Two passages are quoted in full here as they represent a full and frank assessment of the military strength of the OPM and how the TNI understands the West Papuan civil resistance to Indonesian rule to be organised:

Armed groups consist of 2 groups (PEMKA and MARVIC) with strength of +/- 1,129 people and mixed weapons numbering +/- 131 and grenades,

⁷ *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*, p.3

⁸ Of course there are now roughly equal numbers of Indonesian settlers and their descendants alongside the Papuans in both provinces. They feature very little in the *Anatomy*.

⁹ *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*, p.3

experienced and able to conduct a guerrilla war/survive in the forest, spread throughout almost every regency in Papua.¹⁰

Political groups consist of Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) which has a strength of +/- 16,867 people, with capabilities in propaganda and political diplomacy, spread throughout Papua and outside of Papua. Clandestine network of separatist supporting bureaucrats (Papuan People's Council 15 persons, House of Representatives 8 people, and regional governments 18 people).

This is the most detailed assessment ever made of the actual armed strength of the OPM and a somewhat less reliable (and slightly mysterious) estimate of the "political" strength of the "separatist" or West Papuan nationalist movement. A "*Bintang Kejora*" (Morning Star) group is named by reference to the almost universally accepted Papuan independence flag devised in 1961, but this group, the West Papua National Authority, is often associated with the so-called 14 Star independence flag originally flown in 1988.¹¹

Most estimates of OPM numbers made in the past have been largely guesswork. OPM reports of its own strength are generally grossly inflated. The TNI's *Anatomy* figures are backed up in Slides 6-27 which break down the different OPM commands — indicating their geographic areas of operation, leadership, number of members and armoury.

It is interesting that the *Anatomy* divides the OPM into two distinct factions. The divide between the northern coastal commands and those of the interior is well understood; however never before so clearly delineated as in this document. MARVIC stands for "Marcus Victoria", the name of the original OPM command under the control of Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in the early 1970s. The two men fell out in 1976 and Prai started another OPM command, PEMKA (*Pemulihan Keadilan*: Restoration of Justice). The falling out seems to have been more personal than political – Prai took a second wife from Biak Island, Rumkorem's homeland, which seemed to spark the bitter conflict between the two. MARVIC split along ethnic lines, the Biaks and coastal OPM staying with Rumkorem and the highlanders going with Prai. OPM history acknowledges this split,¹² but does not emphasise it; the TNI obviously does, perhaps keen to exploit any division amongst their enemies. In any event the *Anatomy* pursues its analysis of the two groups *in extenso*.

The map on Slide 6 of the *Anatomy* is significant and is reproduced here (see Figure 1). It shows the area of operations and strength of the 20 groups that make up, in the *Anatomy's* view, the PEMKA faction of the OPM. The strongest group is under the command of Mathias Wenda, with 460 guerrillas and nine weapons. This is a well-known group that dwells in West Papua's north border region, extending to the Bewani Mountains of PNG. The other

¹⁰ A later estimate of OPM numbers in the *Anatomy* is 1,495.

¹¹ The best-known exile in the WPNA is its Foreign Affairs representative, Jacob Rumbiak, former prison colleague of Xanana Gusmao, who lives in Melbourne.

¹² See Jim Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism*, University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.40, quoting an interview with John Otto Ondawame.

groups are spread throughout the country with the exception of the northern coastal areas. Several groups are described as having fewer than 20 members, including the late Kelly Kwalik's group, which operates in the Amungme tribal area around the Freeport copper and gold mine. This is a surprising force estimate as Kwalik, who was killed by *Brimob* (Mobile Brigade) police in December 2009, was one of the most active and famous OPM commanders. He had led his command since the 1970s and had carried out numerous operations over the years, claiming (and generally acknowledged as earning) the title Supreme Commander of the OPM. This would appear to be an underestimation of the forces that Kwalik led and is a warning to the reader that the figures in the *Anatomy* should be taken as indicative only.



Figure 1: Slide 6, *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists*

Indeed all the figures and associated information in the *Anatomy* should be taken as indicative, but also as an apparently honest attempt by the author to provide realistic estimates. The nature of the conflict makes it difficult to be precise about exact numbers, as the *Anatomy* has tried to do, if merely because of the ebb and flow of people involved in the movement over time. There is also a considerable grey area in deciding what constitutes a seasoned guerrilla fighter as opposed to a new recruit, temporary fighter or even a "camp follower".

Slide 7 is also reproduced here (Figure 2) as it shows the TNI's conception of the West Papuan nationalist or "separatist" struggle: its strategies and goals. The overarching goal is said to be "referendum" – demand for a replay of the flawed 1969 Act of Free Choice. There is a direct link here to "Foreign Involvement", implying that the political and military actions engaged in by the "separatists" are pitched, at least in part, to an international audience. Like the long struggle in East Timor, the Indonesian state will never be defeated militarily on the ground, but in the arena of world opinion the likely outcome is not so clear.



Figure 2: Slide 7, *Anatomy of Separatists*. The bottom of the slide, irreproducible here, reads "(Organizational Base of Papua Taskforce)"

The next 20 slides contain "bio-data" on each PEMKA OPM command and its leader. This includes some background on individual commanders as well as lists of activities – military attacks, flag raisings and secret meetings. The first slide is for Kelly Kwalik and his group of OPM/TPN fighters. As previously mentioned, Kwalik was killed by Indonesian police on December 16, 2009. They were arresting him in a late night raid after recent killings on the Freeport mine road. He was shot while "resisting arrest",¹³ in what many believe was a targeted assassination. Kwalik's "bio-data" does not record his death; other OPM leaders in the *Anatomy* who have been killed or died have a rough cross scrawled over their images. This seems to indicate that the document was written (or last updated) before December 16, 2009.

¹³ "We Had to Kill Kwalik Say Indonesian Police," *Jakarta Globe*, 17 December 2009.

Kwalik's bio data allows us to assess the quality of information supplied, as he was the best-known OPM/TPN commander. There is no mention of Kwalik's most famous action – the 1996 kidnapping of a group of European and Indonesian scientists. And he is attributed with the killing of three Freeport employees (including two Americans) on August 31, 2002. These killings were highly contentious – Kwalik always denied his involvement. Eventually Antonius Wamang and several other Papuans were convicted of the murders in a trial some observers described as a farce. Serious questions still remain about who actually coordinated the attack, with early suspicions of TNI complicity never properly addressed.¹⁴ Nevertheless the bio-data on Kwalik, and presumably the other OPM commanders and their groups, can be seen to have considerable grounding in known fact, even if condensed to fit into a one page summary. The bio-data on each group therefore provides important information on what the individual OPM/TPN commands actually consist of.

Slide 28, reproduced below, shows the “Disposition, Composition and Strength of GSP/B Markas Victoria (MARVIC) group”.¹⁵ There are 11 groups consisting of 403 persons with 53 guns and one grenade. These groups are, on the whole, smaller and less active than the PEMKA groups. The largest group is the Sarmi command under Silas Awete, although no activity is recorded for this group since 2004. Three commands have no bio-data; their files containing only the statement “there have been no conspicuous actions as of yet”.



Figure 3: Slide 28, Anatomy of Papuan Separatists

¹⁴ See S. Eben Kirksey and Andreas Harsono. “Criminal Collaborations? Antonius Wamang and the Indonesian Military in Timika”, *South East Asia Research* 16 (2) 2008, pp165-197

¹⁵ GSP: *Gerakan Separatis Bersenjata*—Armed Separatist Movement

The most active group appears to be that of Hans (Richard) Uri Yuweni's group, with 31 men, ten guns and one pistol. Yuweni is described as "the High Commander of West Papuan guerrillas although he has not been acknowledged as such by PEMKA, especially Mathias Wenda". Yuweni was appointed Supreme Commander of the OPM/TPN by the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation in 2008. The lack of recorded action by these commands, but the recognition of their continued existence, can probably be attributed to the fact that the regions in which they operate and live are far more densely populated by Indonesian migrants than the regions where PEMKA groups operate. The terrain of the coastal areas is also much more accessible and less remote than the mountainous interior, making clandestine guerrilla activity more difficult. Most are also far removed from the PNG border, rendering that relative safe-haven inaccessible.

Slide 42 (see Figure 4) amalgamates the information provided on MARVIC and PEMKA guerrilla groups to provide an overall picture of the "Territorial War Commands (KODAP) GSP/B", which is shown below. There are ten KODAPs that cover virtually all of West Papua. The leader of each KODAP is named, including such well known, long serving commanders as Kwalik, Bernadus Mawen, Hans Uri Joweni (Yuweni) and Tadius Yogi. This map proves what the OPM has long claimed: that there is a longstanding guerrilla network that is relatively well organised and which operates across the whole country.



Figure 4: Slide 42, Anatomy of Separatists

Slide 43 lists the OPM/TPN's "Known Activities":

- planned attacks on TNI/Polri posts
- intimidating/terrorizing the community that is against them
- secret meetings to set strategy and plan attacks
- circulating pamphlets to gain community support
- recruiting OPM/TPN members
- flying the Morning Star flag to grab the attention of the international community.

The international community is again mentioned here as an audience for OPM/TPN actions, although most flag raisings are performed as a ritual by West Papuans who passionately believe in the justness of their struggle as a reaffirmation of their sense of solidarity and purpose. Grabbing the attention of the international community is clearly not the only reason the flag is raised, although it was this very idea on flag raising to grab international attention that prompted President SBY to issue PP 77 in 2007, a regulation later used to jail more Papuans for flag raising.

There is also much debate on the degree to which OPM groups terrorise “the community that is against them”. There have been well-recorded clashes between different factions of the OPM going back to the 1976 *Markas Victoria* split. There have also been accusations of criminal behaviour by OPM/TPN commands. However it is not known how much of the Papuan community is against the OPM/TPN, a necessary corollary of this “known” activity. Anecdotal evidence and the personal experience of the present authors would suggest that a large proportion of the population favours independence from Indonesia, even if some doubt that this will ever come about. There are also, obviously, a group of West Papuans who are currently benefiting from Indonesian rule, such as Franzalbert Joku, discussed above and later, and the two provincial governors, the 30-plus *bupatis* and the Papuan civil servants staffing the rapidly escalating number of regencies. How much of the Papuan community supports these pro-Indonesian leaders and opposes the programmes and goals of the OPM is beyond the scope of this report, except to reiterate that all our research and feedback indicate overwhelming Papuan support for the OPM and its chief aim: independence for West Papua.

Disposition and Structure of Papuan Separatist Political Movements (GSP/P)

The *Anatomy* now moves from the military realm to the political. The organisational structure reproduced below (see Figure 5) from Slide 45 entitled “Central Structure GSP/P” also shows how the military wing of the OPM fits in with the political, non-violent West Papuan organisations. The OPM/TPN is shown as having two Commanders-in-Chief; Hans Uri Joweni for the MARVIC faction and Mathias Wenda for PEMKA. This neatly unifies the OPM in a single command structure, even if some disputes between MARVIC and PEMKA remain unresolved. Commander in Chief of the TPN is shown as

Joweni, although, as we have noted, this may not be accepted by Wenda and PEMKA. Both factions are shown as under the nominal authority of Edison Waromi and the WPNA (West Papuan National Authority). The importance of this diagram is that this is how the TNI sees the “separatist” chain of command. It clearly puts Edison Waromi in a position of acknowledged authority together with the WPNA, the most recognised umbrella organisation for civil resistance groups on the ground in West Papua. This is what the leadership of the WPNA, such as Foreign Affairs representative, Jacob Rumbiak, have long claimed. The other major umbrella organisations, the WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), disputes this, although obviously the author of the *Anatomy* does not.




Figure 5: Slide 45, *Anatomy of Separatism*

The nine slides that follow show the organisational structures of the main Papuan political bodies. These organisations fit into the “Central Structure GSP/P” chart illustrated, which represents a “master plan” of West Papuan civil society. Everybody in these charts, which include most West Papuan civil society leaders, is considered a “separatist”, and therefore a traitor and enemy of the TNI and Indonesian state. This amounts to branding almost the whole (with the exception of those discussed above) of the West Papuan people as enemies. This is a very dangerous assessment by the TNI. Ben

Kiernan, renowned scholar of the Cambodian genocide,¹⁶ has commented that West Papua constitutes a “possible case” for a future genocide.¹⁷

The three organisations that are highlighted in this assessment are the PAP (Papuan Customary Government), headed by Fadhal Al Hamid; the Papuan Presidium Council, under Thom Beanal, and the DAP (Papuan Customary Council), headed by Forkorus Yaboisembut. Other leading West Papuans named in this document include the (now deceased) former head of the MRP, the Papuan upper house of parliament, Agus Alua, and the heads of the three largest Protestant Papuan churches, Benny Giay, Herman Awom and Socrates Sofyan Yoman. The names and accompanying diagrams cover the whole of the country, including down to the different tribal groupings, the building blocks of Melanesian society. This is not the mapping of a few disgruntled individuals opposed to the status quo, but a detailed and comprehensive picture of an entire society in quiet, or not-so-quiet revolt against what they see as a foreign occupation.

Foreign Support for Papuan Separatists

Slides 56 to 62 of the *Anatomy* are lists of perceived foreign supporters of the Free Papua Movement. They are detailed and methodical, although also seriously flawed. While expatriate West Papuans, such as John Otto Ondawame, Rex Rumakiek, Jacob Rumbiak and Benny Wenda are accurately identified as pro-independence, the non-Papuan support list is hit-and-miss. The “Foreign NGO Networks/Foreign Leaders in Support of Free Papua” list for Australia (Slide 60) contains both people who are long time activists as well as people who would not consider themselves as such at all. Number one on the list is Peter King, co-convenor of the West Papua Project at Sydney University and one of the authors of this report, who could be legitimately considered a supporter of West Papuan independence. However, others on the list such as Richard Chauvel, Geoff Mulherin and Naomi Robson would probably not identify themselves with this aim.

Lists for other countries are also haphazard, signalling confusion on the part of the *Anatomy’s* author, and consequent resort to a scattergun approach. With regard to the US and Ireland, large numbers of members of parliament and congresspersons are included because they have signed letters protesting against human rights abuses in West Papua, rather than actively promoting independence.¹⁸ The lists sometimes verge on the bizarre, such as naming PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare as an OPM supporter when he has pursued the opposite course - strong support for Indonesia - for decades. It is fair to say that the lists of foreign supporters have been compiled by naming people who have ever publicly expressed concern about the human rights

¹⁶ See Ben Kiernan, *A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, Yale, New Haven, 2009.

¹⁷ ABC Radio, “Late Night Live” with Philip Adams, 4 August 2009.

¹⁸ See Slides 61 and 62

situation in West Papua, particularly if they are prominent people or politicians. Of course the lists also contain people who *are* strong supporters of a Free West Papua, but there are glaring omissions, such as Joe Collins, Secretary of the Australian West Papua Association, Sydney, who has campaigned for independence for years.

Bio-data on Leading West Papuan Separatists

Slides 64 to 95 contain the “Bio-data and Antecedents” of the leading West Papuan dissidents. It represents what the Indonesian military would consider a rogues’ gallery — for West Papuans a roll of honour — but which looks to outsiders disturbingly like a “hit list”. Indeed the first individual described is the late Chief Theys Eluay, who was murdered by *Kopassus* soldiers on November 10, 2001 in Jayapura. Surprisingly, and dishonestly, the author of the *Anatomy* has entered in Eluay’s bio-data that he was “kidnapped.....by an unknown person”.¹⁹ The six *Kopassus* soldiers responsible for killing Eluay were later found guilty only of mistreatment and battery leading to his death, not of murder. Indonesian Army General Ryamizard Ryacudu called the convicted men “Indonesian heroes” for killing a rebel. They were sentenced to between two and three and a half years jail. The “disappearance” of They’s driver, Aristoteles Masoka, was never investigated to the point of charges being laid and remains unresolved.

It can be assumed that the 32 individuals who are highlighted in the *Anatomy* are seen as the leading Papuan “separatists” involved in the non-violent political sphere, the military leaders having already been identified. Geographically these individuals hail from right across the country, representing the highlands and coastal regions, urban areas and remote tribes. There are first generation leaders who have long been in opposition to Indonesia as well as many representatives of the second and also the “current” generation of student and youth activists. There are at least six Christian church leaders: Benny Giay, Herman Awom, Socrates Sofyan Yoman, Obet Komba, Ny Beatrix Koibur and Terryanus Yoku.

The bio-data on these people relates mostly to political meetings, flag raisings, the formation of political groups such as FORERI,²⁰ taking part in the *Mubes* of 2000,²¹ taking part in demonstrations and asking for political asylum. None of these actions was or is violent, and should not be considered illegal under Indonesia’s own civil and political rights laws and treaty

¹⁹ Slide 64

²⁰ FORERI: Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society, formed 24 July, 1998, Jayapura.

²¹ *Mubes: Musyawarah Besar*, “Grand Consultation”, held in Jayapura, 24-27 February 2000. See Peter King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?* UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, p.29ff.

obligations, which guarantee freedom of expression. While the OPM/TPN leaders have made a decision to take up arms against the state, and are therefore operating outside Indonesian law, civil society leaders have eschewed violence and their persecution is purely on political grounds.

The last slide is number 96, “Known Activities” of the GSP/P. These actions and activities include:

- [being] active in rallies rejecting *Otsus*, the military and PP77²² leading to a referendum and secret meetings to complete plans/strategies for activities in the struggle for Papuan independence
- [holding] press conferences/seminars and making pamphlets as a form of propaganda to publicize to the community that Papua is already independent & supported by the international community
- [being] active in the commemoration of Papuan days 1st July (West Papua Sovereignty Day) and 1st December (West Papua Independence Day) to get sympathy from the international community
- political lobbying of NGOs, congress and parliament members abroad advancing the issues of the failure of *Otsus*, human rights violations & the Act of Free Choice
- flying the Morning Star flag in order to show the existence of a struggle and planning to form a team of 15 to ask for support for Papuan independence from Barack Obama (U.S. President)

In most democracies these activities would be completely within the rights of citizens to pursue. That they have become criminalised in West Papua, and the subject of intense military intelligence scrutiny shows how seriously the Indonesian government takes the issue of Papuan “separatism”.

It is interesting to note that four of the five activities listed are directed at (in the view of the author of the *Anatomy*) the international community, or members of it, such as President Barack Obama. This suggests that while the TNI are not particularly concerned by “separatists” as constituting a threat to order and control in Papua – the situation was described as “generally conducive” in slide 2 – they are very worried about how the issue will play out on the international stage. Indeed the fact that the very last words in the *Anatomy* are “U.S. President” would support this view.

When Barack Obama was elected US President on 4 November 2008 there was great hope among Papuans that the first Black president might change US policy in favour of the West Papuans. This was not just a belief based on

²² Indonesian Regulation No. PP77/2007 bans the public display of “separatist symbols”.

colour sympathy. There are 40 Black US senators and congresspersons who have formed a group known as the “Black Caucus”, which, as the name suggests, looks after the interests of Black Americans. A leading figure in this group is American Samoan Congressman Eni Faleomavaega, who has a long history of being sympathetic towards the plight of the West Papuans and raising his concerns in international forums. However, if anything, the US has grown closer to Indonesia over the course of Obama’s presidency, as the US promotes the world’s largest Muslim nation and third largest democracy as a role model for the Islamic world. The election of Obama may well have been a catalyst for producing the *Anatomy*.

Whatever the motivation for the production of the *Anatomy*, it is fortuitous for concerned observers of the West Papuan conflict. This document, like recently leaked WikiLeaks documents, confirms the nature of the military presence in West Papua, which must be characterised as a military occupation. The OPM/TPN is much more than a few ragtag rebels running around the bush, and the West Papuan nationalist movement is much more than a few “separatists”, according to the *Anatomy* (and most Papuans). The latter seems to include most of West Papuan civil society, certainly the leaders of the churches, the student movement, customary organisations, tribal organisations, regional organisations and even the MRP, the all-Papuan upper house created under the Special Autonomy legislation.

The *Anatomy* could be viewed as a more detailed socio-political overview of Papuan resistance than has ever previously been undertaken. Obviously the Indonesian military has the freedom of movement and the resources, including a vast network of intelligence agents, to put the necessary data together. From our knowledge of the individuals, organisations and linkages canvassed, the great bulk of information contained in this *Anatomy* is broadly valid, if somewhat ahistorical. A striking exception is where the author tries to map foreign support for the Free Papua movement. Here the information is patchy, unreliable, and even flatly wrong.

What is frightening about this document, besides that it identifies almost the entire West Papuan leadership (and by inference their followers, so therefore the bulk of the West Papuan population) as “separatists” and thus state enemies, is the complete lack of a policy to deal with the conflict beyond repression. There is no “hearts and minds” strategy here to win back the affection of the West Papuans. For the military, and by implication for the government in Jakarta, which has upheld the impunity of its security forces in West Papua unchallenged for two generations, there are no new policies worth the name in place at all, except continued surveillance, persecution, targeted assassination and restricting information flowing out to the international community, while cultivating and effectively corrupting a narrow stratum of elected and unelected Papuan officials and politicians. In other words, business as usual.

The remainder of this report provides an analysis of the accompanying military files passed to us together with the *Anatomy*. These documents reveal

in detail the ways in which psychological warfare is used by the Indonesian security forces to maintain the Indonesian occupation of West Papua.

Section 2: An Occupation of Fear: The Effects of PSYOPS in West Papua

The Indonesian occupation of West Papua depends to a large degree on its redoubtable exercise of “PSYOPS” or “PSYWAR” – the psychological operations through which it has waged its almost five decades-long and largely covert war against the West Papuan people. The sensational set of secret TNI documents (of which the *Anatomy* is the outstanding one) outlining its enemies and operations in West Papua came to light in early 2011, demonstrating in formidable detail the range of PSYOPS techniques used against West Papuan individuals and communities on a daily basis, and revealing the other mechanisms by which the Indonesian occupation is maintained.

Kopassus and the Takeover of West Papua

Indonesia’s military infiltration and attempted seizure of West Papua from the Dutch in 1961-62 was effectuated, primarily, by its gruelingly trained Special Forces, the RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*), which came to be known eventually in 1986 as *Kopassus* (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*). According to Ken Conboy:

In a nation where the military has played an influential social and political role since its founding, perhaps no unit has wielded more power – and seen more combat – than *Kopassus*. ... From the jungles of Irian Jaya [sic] to the backrooms of Jakarta’s most powerful political figures, this elite group of commandos has influenced nearly every major policy decision taken since its inception in 1952.²³

Conboy contends that the Special Forces “were structured unlike anything else in the military” and that their presence in West Papua was, initially at least, “intended to win the hearts and minds of their targeted populace”.²⁴ However, the RPKAD/*Kopassus* encountered resistance from the beginning, with one team leader complaining, “The Papuans do not support us. They do not give us food; we must look for our own food or barter with our valuable equipment. They report on our movements to the Dutch”.²⁵ West Papuan resistance has not subsided in the five decades since, and neither has the

²³ Ken Conboy, *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces*, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2003. Quote is from back cover. Irian Jaya became Papua province in 2000.

²⁴ *Ibid* p. 70.

²⁵ *Ibid* pp. 74-5.

Indonesian government's determination to occupy West Papua through ever-expanding military deployments and widespread use of torture and other terrifying psychological operations. Euphemistically defined by the Inter-American Defense Board as "the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives",²⁶ PSYOPS, as utilised by *Kopassus* and other elements of the Indonesian military in West Papua, has served to consolidate a simmering, occasionally boiling over, anti-Indonesian nationalism among the Papuans which is contained primarily through fear.

What Are PSYOPS and How Do They Work?

Paul Linebarger writes that PSYOPS involves "the supplementing of normal military operations by the use of mass communications".²⁷ As such, it "comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such military operational measures as may supplement the propaganda".²⁸ According to communications expert Christopher Simpson, "since World War II, US military and NATO manuals have typically defined 'psychological warfare' or 'psychological operations' as tactics as varied as propaganda, covert operations, guerrilla warfare, and, more recently, public diplomacy".²⁹ Simpson argues that, at its heart, "modern psychological warfare has been a tool for managing empire, not for settling conflicts in any fundamental sense. It has operated largely as a means to ensure that indigenous democratic initiatives in the Third World and Europe did not go 'too far'",³⁰ which perhaps explains why psychological warfare so often fails to win occupied peoples' hearts and minds in any meaningful fashion, including in West Papua where Papuans have chosen with good reason to resist the internal imperium and pseudo-democratic initiatives of Jakarta. Their reward so far is hinted at by Peter Watson, who writes that "fear, hate, deceit, pain, humiliation, loneliness, homesickness, envy, jealousy – this black side of human nature is the currency in which the psychological warfare specialist (or 'psywarrior' as he is sometimes known) trades".³¹

The units and functions of this currency, used to maximum effect by the TNI as evidenced in our set of leaked documents, comprise the focus of the

²⁶ Phil Taylor, *Glossary of Relevant Terms and Acronyms: Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Studies*, The Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, 1987. Accessed, 17 May, 2010. Available at <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=64&paper=665>.

²⁷ Paul Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, Arno Press, New York, 1972, p. 40.

²⁸ *Ibid* p. 25.

²⁹ Christopher Simpson. *Science of Coercion: Communicative Research and Psychological Warfare 1945-1960*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 11.

³⁰ *Ibid* p. 8.

³¹ Peter Watson. 1978. *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. London: Hutchinson of London, p. 37.

remainder of this report. These documents from 2007 and 2008, remarkable in their intricacy of detail, even despite their many inaccuracies, include:

- A comprehensive PowerPoint presentation titled *Anatomy of Papuan Separatists* (discussed in detail in the first half of this report);
- A thick set of files on TNI agents based in Kotaraja, Jayapura, labeled *Agents' Biodata*, detailing each agent's potential for infiltrating various West Papuan resistance organisations;
- A set of *Secret Information Reports* from Assistance Taskforce 5/Papua, Post I, Kotaraja. These reports feature information gleaned from TNI agents who have infiltrated various West Papuan community meetings, cultural events, church gatherings, political meetings and political demonstrations. An "informant's analysis" is included at the end of each report;
- An Excel spreadsheet of *Recruitment Results: Conditions of Support* from Taskforce 5, Post Kotaraja, from May-September 2007. This document lists co-opted West Papuan TNI agents' perceptions of the West Papua-Indonesia conflict;
- A file on West Papuan TNI agents including photographs for each, as well as names, age, ethnicity, religion, occupation, address, marriage status, names of children, and personal characteristics; and
- A PowerPoint documenting, through photographs, a series of West Papuan events attended by TNI troops, including: *Monitoring Activities at District Churches in Illu*, *Presentation of Ideas About the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI³²) and Socialisation of Presidential Decree No.77, 10 December 2007 to Village Heads, Tribal Leaders and Pastors*, *Community Health Services and Treatment for the People of Jigonikme by Post-7 Illu*, and *Athletics with the People of Illu District*.

Drawing on these leaked files and other similar documents and related events, an analysis of the ways in which the TNI continues to carry out PSYOPS to maintain Indonesia's occupation of West Papua follows.

PSYOPS in West Papua

Maintaining a military occupation through PSYOPS depends on the use of "white", "gray" and "black" propaganda.³³ White propaganda, "issued from an acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of a government, [and] including military commands at various levels, ... is associated with overt psychological operations".³⁴ It "makes an overt appeal to the target

³² The acronym NKRI (*Negri Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, or Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) summarises Indonesia's nationalist ideology – that the territorial integrity of Indonesia comprises the geographical/political terrain "from Sabang to Merauke" (Indonesia's northwestern-most island in Aceh to its southeastern-most town in West Papua).

³³ Linebarger, op. cit., p. 44.

³⁴ Ibid.

audience”.³⁵ In West Papua, this amounts to the circulation of NKRI ideology with a positive spin, and the offering of various inducements to West Papuans to elicit their support. Gray propaganda “spreads the message favored by the source, but is issued in the name of some other entity”.³⁶ In other words, in West Papua, Papuans or non-government/military agents are co-opted to uphold the Indonesian occupation. Black propaganda is “the most deceptive form; ... messages are issued in the name of the source’s *enemy*”.³⁷ This includes forging documents, infiltration of the opposition, the spreading of rumours and other methods—all familiar in West Papua as part of strategies of inducement, co-option and coercion.³⁸

Inducement

“A strategy of inducement provides resources to the occupied population in an effort to buy its acquiescence”.³⁹ Despite limited success, the TNI still engages such “white propaganda” tactics in attempts to win the hearts and minds of West Papuans. Such tactics are demonstrated in perhaps their most benign manifestation in the leaked TNI document that depicts troops visiting various highlands Papuan communities. One slide in a PowerPoint presentation under the heading *Community Health Services and Treatment for the People of Jigonikme by Post-7 Illu* shows a soldier in civilian attire feeding an infant in its mother’s arms using a plastic spoon, and another providing a child with a drink, in a makeshift clinic. In another slide titled *Athletics with the People of Illu District* troops are on a highlands soccer field with Papuan villagers kicking a ball around and posing for photos. Each of these scenarios depict obvious attempts by the TNI to bond with the local people by offering simple health care services, or participating in community sporting activities.

Yet a different sentiment is apparent in other photos within the same PowerPoint file, particularly in one slide with the heading, *Results of Presenting Presidential Decree No. 77 10 December 2007 to the Community*, in which one soldier comes in three scenarios: in the first photograph he stares straight ahead at the camera shaking the hand of a seated, older Papuan man whose head is slightly bowed in apparent unease; in the second photograph this soldier sits with his arm around a young Papuan man who stares at the ground, smoking a cigarette and looking unhappy; and, in the third photo, the same soldier stands above a group of seated Papuans holding a rifle, while another soldier sits in front of him holding a machete, with his arm slung around an uncomfortably-huddled Papuan woman. Each of these images suggests that the activities of “inducement” engaged in by Indonesian troops together with Papuan communities involve a power

³⁵ Jon Elliston. *Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda*, Ocean Press, Melbourne, 1999, p. 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ David Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2008, pp. 49-54.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 51.

differential in which the Papuans, grateful for the services (or afraid of appearing ungrateful), in return tolerate the presence of the troops. Thus it is not clear how far such “inducements” achieve the Indonesian-intended outcome of winning Papuans to the NKRI ideology. This is particularly so given that in December 2010 it was revealed that a troop from *Kostrad* (the army’s Strategic Reserve Command),

Army Second Lieutenant Cosmos, commander of Kolome Post in Illu District, Papua, has been found guilty of torturing civilians and sentenced to four months in prison. ... Cosmos was charged with torturing a number of people living in Puncak Jaya, Papua, last March. Meanwhile, Private FC Sahminan Husain Lubis, Private Joko Sulistiono and Private Dwi Purwanto, have been sentenced to three months jail time for the same offence.⁴⁰

Another of the leaked documents reveals details reported by Assistance Taskforce-5 at Post 1, Kotaraja, of preparations for the celebration of Indonesia’s 62nd Independence Day in Abepura District, Jayapura. Of the three advisors to the organising committee, one was the Area Military (*Ramil*) Commander. The white propagandistic PSYOPS activities planned included “painting the main road and walls”, a “mini-football match”, a “sepak takraw [kick volleyball] match in front of the District office”, children’s competitions such as “shrimp cracker eating”, and raising the “red/white [Indonesian flag]”. However, there are more coercive aspects to these ostensibly community-building events, as evidenced in a file note that reads, “there are still houses which have not yet raised Indonesian flags, ... [despite] the order that it is compulsory to raise the Indonesian flag from the Abepura District beginning 14 August 2007 from morning until night during the celebration of Indonesian Independence Day”. An accompanying photograph with these file notes depicts a street wall painted with an Indonesian flag, around which is written “*NKRI Harga Mati*” – NKRI even at the cost of death.

PSYOPS inducements, or bribes, have also been used to detrimental effect by the TNI against West Papuan people. As military analyst Watson has pointed out, a common PSYOPS technique is to study one’s enemies’ vulnerabilities and manipulate their points of weakness.⁴¹ Markus Haluk, a West Papuan independence activist whose activities are closely monitored and frequently noted by the TNI in these files, has remarked: “Special Autonomy is another form of subjugation through money—local officials are allocated so much money they [have] lost their integrity and dignity [through] excessive drinking [and by] ... spreading HIV/AIDS”.⁴²

Papuans have remarked that a self-perceived weakness of Papuan men for alcohol, money and women has meant that they have been easily seduced by all three in exchange for betraying their own ultimate interests and working for corrupt Indonesian interests in West Papua.⁴³ This has been a source of

⁴⁰ “Soldiers Found Guilty of Papua Torture,” *Tempo*, 10 November 2010

⁴¹ Watson op. cit., p. 388.

⁴² Markus Haluk, *Interview with one of the authors*, December 2008, Jayapura.

⁴³ Adat leader, *Interview with one of the authors*, November 2008, Merauke.

shame and anxiety within West Papuan indigenous community organisations that are working for peace, justice and independence.⁴⁴ All of these examples have demonstrated that the TNI excels at “strategic and tactical propaganda”, but, to borrow the words of Linebarger’s textbook, they have “never solved the problem of consolidation propaganda. ... They [have never] won the real loyalty of the peoples whom they [keep attempting to] conquer”.⁴⁵

Co-option

Successful strategies of accommodation co-opt local elites into the occupation project. Those elites come to see the occupation as a means for ensuring their own position of power within the occupied territory both during and after the occupation. Ideally for an occupying power, these elites, in turn, convince the occupied population to suppress its nationalism and accept the ... occupation.⁴⁶

Edelstein’s description of co-option as a technique of gray propagandistic PSYOPS is an apt analysis of the official process of *pemekaran* (division) in West Papua, whereby the Papua and Papua Barat provinces are increasingly divided into smaller units of administration. *Pemekaran* allows for the further subdivision and absorption of Special Autonomy money and power by local elites, as well as the further proliferation of military commands, and is seen by many Papuans and analysts as a “divide and rule” strategy by Jakarta to co-opt and corrupt Papuan community leaders, dissuading them from resisting Jakarta’s occupation.⁴⁷

In a more direct manner, the TNI uses co-option as an occupation strategy to infiltrate Papuan resistance networks. As in Aceh, where “‘infiltration’ cover[ed] the ‘turning’ of GAM [*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, or Free Aceh Movement] members, usually upon compromise from interrogations, searches, capture, and coercion [of] family members”,⁴⁸ so too in Papua, the TNI employs indigenous Papuans, even former OPM guerrilla members, for resistance network infiltration. Based in Port Vila, Vanuatu, exiled OPM member and Vice-chairman of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, Otto Ondawame, writes that these “turned” Papuans “are often more dangerous than the real enemy because they can infiltrate local society and orchestrate protests and rallies”.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ OPM group, *Interview with one of the authors*, November 2008, Merauke; Rika Korain, *Interview with one of the authors*, December 2008, Jayapura.

⁴⁵ Linebarger op. cit., p. 16.

⁴⁶ Edelstein op. cit., pp. 49-50.

⁴⁷ See for example Richard Chauvel. “Rulers in Their Own Country?” *Inside Indonesia* 94 (Oct-Dec 2008). Accessed 17 March, 2011. Available from <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-94/rulers-in-their-own-country>

⁴⁸ Matthew Davies, *Indonesia’s War over Aceh*, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 196

⁴⁹ Otto Ondawame. *One People, One Soul*, Crawford House Publishing, Adelaide, 2010, p.155

Ondawame's concerns are confirmed in the leaked TNI file that provides information about Papuan secret agents who are used as spies by the military. Each agent listed in the Kotaraja area is given a profile, with notes on their various personality characteristics and capacities. For example, one 23 year-old male, originally from Biak, "has potential to feign in joining the activities of Markus Haluk and Buktar Tabuni" (currently imprisoned for "inciting hatred toward the government"⁵⁰). Another agent could "provide information about the campus students' movement". Another can provide "information about the activities of press conferences and demonstrations". One agent working as a rental car driver "often provides information if there is someone from GSP [OPM] group that rents a car and talks about 'M'".⁵¹

An agent who works at a telephone credit counter "often helps by providing cell phone numbers for those buying phone credit [at his shop]". Other agents in Puncak Jaya are variously described as "stubborn and egotistical in defending ... opinions"; "available to mobilize the masses for whatever is needed by Post Illu"; persuaded to work because of "material motives", and of "sour disposition" and "indolent" - yet possessing "high mobility" and influence with officials. Another agent is described thus: "his weakness is that he is often drunk, but it can still be controlled". One village head was apparently able to be co-opted by the TNI because he "was ill-treated by [Goliat Tabuni's group] for not providing funds or logistical assistance, to the point that he ... developed a personal resistance to them" – thus his allegiances were manipulated. In another example, a young Papuan man, who is described as "slightly shy [but] smiles readily", is used because he is "looked up to by his friends", and has useful connections as he "often goes to the forest to search for wood".

These Papuan spies are then used by the TNI to attend West Papuan events and report back on resistance activities and plans. Information such as the following is attributed to "earnest" informants:

- a. On Thursday, 16 August 2007 at 19.30 (Eastern Indonesian Time) at Adonai restaurant in a shopping center in Jayapura, Markus Haluk received a donation from a member of Papua's Provincial Legislature (DPRP Papua) in the name of Dr. __ (from __)⁵² of Rp. 5.000.000 possibly for his trip to Jakarta.
- b. On Friday, 17 August 2007, at 9.00 (Eastern Indonesian Time) Markus Haluk flew to Jakarta on a Merpati flight in order to lead a rally at the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) planned for Monday 20 August 2007 with an unknown number of people. Their planned demands are to ask for a special session to implement a national dialogue and hear opinions. If any of their demands are not met by the government, they will sleep at the DPR RI [the lower house of parliament in Jakarta] and

⁵⁰ Nivell Rayda. 2010. "Papuan "Political Prisoners" on Hunger Strike After Being Denied Access to Lawyers," *Jakarta Globe*, 12 December, 2010. Accessed on May 24, 2011. Available at <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/papuan-political-prisoners-on-hunger-strike-after-denied-access-to-lawyers/411222>.

⁵¹ "M" here stands for *merdeka*, or independence.

⁵² Name and place of origin omitted by the authors.

conduct a boycott of the 2009 general elections by mobilizing people from the central highlands.

- c. On Friday, 17 August at 14.30 (Eastern Indonesian Time) at the AMPTI secretariat office in Perumnas I, Waena which is also the home of Buktar Tabuni, Rev Socrates Sofyan Yoman⁵³ came to give a donation of money to Buktar Tabuni, which was inside of an envelope so the amount is unknown.

Many similar examples fill the pages of these documents, evidencing the close monitoring of West Papuan independence leaders by co-opted West Papuan TNI agents. “Strategically”, writes Davies, in relation to the actions of the TNI in Aceh, “‘infiltration’ applies also to the creation and sponsorship of so-called ‘splinter’ groups to undermine GAM and its civilian support networks, especially overseas”.⁵⁴ Indonesia has done this in West Papua too, co-opting renowned and politically savvy West Papuan independence activists to work, very publicly, for Indonesian ends. In Davies’ words, “‘PSYOPS’ here denotes Jakarta’s more sensitive, sophisticated, and aggressive manipulation of perceptions, but at strategic levels beyond such counterintelligence activit[ies]”, as described by him above.⁵⁵

For example, high profile West Papuan former independence leaders Franzalbert Joku and Nicolaus Messet are now strident NKRI advocates. Each extols the virtues of Indonesia’s Special Autonomy Law (claimed by most Papuans to be a spectacular failure), and together they have formed the group IGSSARPRI – the Independent Group Supporting Autonomous Region of Papua in the Republic of Indonesia. This group is active, with Indonesia’s financial backing,⁵⁶ in trying to repatriate West Papuan refugees living in Papua New Guinea. Being skilled orators, Joku and Messet are sent by Indonesia as “West Papuan representatives” to international forums such as the September 2010 US Congress Subcommittee hearing in Washington, DC, on *Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?*, and the University of Sydney’s *Comprehending West Papua* conference in Sydney during February 2011, to pursue Indonesian ends. At the former forum which was convened for West Papuan activists to present their appeals against Indonesia, Messet professed to represent an “independent and privately funded group [IGSARPRI] dedicated [to] collaborating with all institutions and individuals whoever they may be, including the government of Indonesia, to

⁵³ Rev Socrates Sofyan Yoman, who is head of the Baptist Synod in West Papua, is a Papuan independence leader and in 2010 topped the list of *Kopassus* enemies in Papua, according to leaked *Kopassus* documents released by journalist Allan Nairn. See ‘Secret Files Show Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special Forces, Targets Papuan Churches, Civilians. Documents Leak from Notorious US-Backed Unit as Obama Lands in Indonesia.’ *News and Comment* (blog), 9 November, 2010: Allan Nairn. Accessed 17 March, 2011. Available from <http://www.allannairn.com/2010/11/breaking-news-secret-files-show.html>

⁵⁴ Davies op. cit., p. 196.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Helen Vatsikopoulos, “Papua’s Special Autonomy: Interview with Papuan Autonomy Advocate Franz Albert Joku”, *Australian Network—Asia Pacific Focus*, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2007. Accessed 17 March, 2011. Transcript available at <http://australiannetwork.com/focus/s2003388.htm>.

creating a just, peaceful and prosperous society in the nation of Indonesia, inclusive of Papua”.⁵⁷ He then entreated that

[the] United States House of Representatives and the United States administration under the leadership of President Barack Hussein Obama, as a matter of regional and international strategic priority, reaffirm and strengthen the comprehensive partnership arrangement between the United States and the Republic of Indonesia without further delay.⁵⁸

The Government of Indonesia has previously, in Aceh, according to Davies, used “turned” Acehnese GAM members to carry out similar public relations PSYOPS stunts to discredit GAM’s aims. In doing so, it has used such stooges to “usurp ... [the Indonesian Government’s] GAM target ... by posing as the latter during formal discussions with Estonia, the USA, and elsewhere”,⁵⁹ “[and] by affect[ing] a certain media sophistication and political intellect in the activist and diplomatic circles, ... repeatedly interdicting foreign media and academics seeking direct contact with GAM”.⁶⁰

In a further effort to discredit the OPM, the TNI has attempted to paint the West Papuan resistance as “terrorists” on the world stage, as they did with GAM.⁶¹ PSYOPS tactics to this end have included referring to the OPM as a “wild terrorist gang” (*Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*)⁶² and “attributing civilian killings and other crimes to enemy action or ‘crossfire’”.⁶³ This includes, for example, the murder of two American schoolteachers and an Indonesian on the road to the Freeport mine below Tembagapura, West Papua, in 2002, for which West Papuan OPM member Antonius Wamang was sentenced to life in prison even though, during initial police investigations by the Jayapura police, the TNI were suspected;⁶⁴ and the shooting of Australian Drew Grant in 2009 near the Freeport mine, which was used to justify, on unsubstantiated evidence, the manhunt and murder of TPN commander Kelly Kwalik by the Indonesian police anti-terror unit, *Densus 88*, and the police mobile brigade, *Brimob*.⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Nicolaus Messet, “Nick Messet: Preliminary Transcript of September 22, 2010 Congressional Hearing on West Papua”. Hearing convened by the Asia, Pacific and Global Environment Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Accessed 17 March 2011. Available from <http://www.etan.org/news/2010/09wpapuahearing.htm>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Davies op. cit., p. 197.

⁶⁰ Ibid p. 199.

⁶¹ Ibid p. 196.

⁶² S. Eben Kirksey and J. A. D. Roemajauw, “The Wild Terrorist Gang: The Semantics of Violence and Self-Determination in West Papua”, *Oxford Development Studies*, 30 (2) 2002, pp.189-203.

⁶³ Davies op. cit., p. 196.

⁶⁴ Kirksey and Harsono, ‘Criminal Collaborations?’, op. cit..

⁶⁵ ‘Blame Denials As More Shot Near Papua Mine’, Radio Australia: Pacific Beat Home, 26 January, 2010. Accessed on 24 May, 2011. Available at <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201001/s2801823.htm>.

See also Jim Elmslie, Camellia Webb-Gannon and Peter King. *Get up, Stand Up: West Papua Stands up for Its Rights: A rebuttal of the International Crisis Group Report No. 188, Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua: West Papuans unite against Special Autonomy and for*

Coercion

Former *Kopassus* commander Lt. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto (who was “forced to retire because of his involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of democracy activists in early 1998”⁶⁶) has argued:

Indonesian culture is very violent and the military is a mirror of society. ... This whole culture in Indonesia is a culture of violence between tribes and ethnic groups. ... This is something that we are aware of, something we do not like, and something that we would like to address, to control, and to manage. But it is there: fighting between families, fighting between villages, fighting between tribes, fighting between ethnic groups, and finally fighting between religions.⁶⁷

Scholar Fuller Collins argues that views such as Prabowo’s are publicly propounded “by ... Indonesian elites ... to suit other purposes. ... These arguments are useful to elites”, she contends, “who make them to mobilize people behind campaigns for a return to order and stability as a means of protecting their own interests against groups demanding land rights, higher wages, and political reform”,⁶⁸ thus legitimising military violence as a means of achieving state ends. This includes, in West Papua, the practice of coercion, which, as defined by Edelstein, “is the use or threatened use of military force to defeat any elements of the population that resist or threaten to resist an occupation”.⁶⁹ PSYOPS, in this sense, is “an instrument for maintaining grossly abusive social structures”.⁷⁰ It succeeds, Edelstein writes, by

...essentially “clearing the decks” of any opposition to the occupation, making room for the occupying power and any supporters it has to implement occupation reforms. In Northern Korea, for example, the coercive occupation strategy after World War II used the latent threat of violence and imprisonment. ... Once [unhappy] citizens were incarcerated, killed or chased away, the threat environment [for the occupier] had improved.⁷¹

Disseminating threats to West Papuan independence activists, via SMS, telephone calls, and the leaving of nasty “souvenirs” are well-known tactics of coercion utilised by the Indonesian security forces in West Papua. Markus Haluk writes in a 2009 report that “Mental or psychological terror is systematically used in some of the following ways”:

A short message (SMS) is sent, a telephone call where no-one answers, the distribution of papers and posters in the street and public places, ... the incitement of some individuals against others, ... [or] Police and Brimob

a referendum on independence, West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2010. Accessed 17 March, 2011. Available from http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/research/west_papua_project.shtml.

⁶⁶ Elizabeth Fuller Collins, ‘Indonesia: A Violent Culture?’ *Asian Survey* 42(4) 2002, p.582.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid* p. 583.

⁶⁹ Edelstein op. cit., p. 53.

⁷⁰ Simpson op. cit., p. 8.

⁷¹ *Ibid* p. 54.

making a scene simulating a hostage taking [for example] on Friday 20 February in the mall of Papua Trade Centre.⁷²

In this report, Haluk tables, for the record, a series of SMS threats that have been received by other Papuan resistance leaders as well as by himself. Some examples:

- “Hey coward, it would be better if you killed yourself. You Papuans will never get freedom even if you live 1000 years”.
- “Your God is the devil and you will not live much longer. It would be good if you would wash, you mangy dog”.
- “Hey Markus Haluk, ... you go to special meetings with KNPB [National Committee of West Papua] for your own self interest. But you will soon be dead. You are trying to beat us, but you are just a traitor, a pig, a dog”.
- “Our cameras are watching you. You are in our focus”.⁷³

When Ardiansyah Matra, a journalist in Merauke, West Papua, who was reporting on the controversial Merauke Food Estate Project near local election time, was found dead in the Gudang Arang River on July 30, 2010, it was discovered that he had previously received a number of SMS threats regarding his work. Following his death, a journalist colleague in Merauke reported that she had received threats via a blood-stained letter, and a further two colleagues subsequently reported that they too had received SMS death threats for their investigative journalistic work, one of which read:

The drums of war are ready, with masses to be deployed one by one, we will slaughter Merauke which is primed to be smeared in the blood of Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and police personnel until they are wiped out hahaha. Journalist cowards, never play with fire if you don't want to get burnt. Because fire will burn your whole body. If you still want to eat in this land, do not do strange things. We have recorded all of your details and get ready to be massacred hahaha.⁷⁴

West Papuan refugees Benny Wenda, now living in Oxford, the UK, and Jacob Rumbiak, now in Melbourne, Australia, have both continued to receive threats via telephone and SMS, even in their new countries of residence. In an email to the authors, Wenda described how

Sometimes I receive telephone calls from people pretending to be Papuan. But they are not really Papuan. When I ask their name and which tribe they are from they never answer my questions. I have also felt threatened through

⁷² Markus Haluk. 2009. *A Report on the Violent Conflict in the Nation of Papua During the Period of the General Election for Legislature and Presidency in April, May, June 2009*. Jayapura. 31 July, 2009.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ 'Indonesian Journalist Death Linked To Election', International News Safety Institute, 2 August 2010. Accessed 25 May, 2011. Available at http://www.newssafety.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19400:bbc-mon&catid=140:indonesia-media-safety&Itemid=100426.

the blogs and email. Pro Indonesian blogs have run slur campaigns against myself and my family".⁷⁵

Rumbiak has revealed that he has received threats, via SMS and telephone, saying, *inter alia*: "We will paralyze you and your network overseas".⁷⁶

Thus, by utilising channels of communication to issue threats against those working for justice in West Papua, Indonesian security forces confirm Simpson's analysis that:

In practice modern psychological warfare and propaganda have only rarely offered "alternatives" to violence over the medium-to-long term. Instead, they have been an integral part of a strategy and culture whose premise [is] the rule of the strong at the expense of the weak, where coercion and manipulation pose as "communication" and close off opportunities for other, more genuine, forms of understanding.⁷⁷

The intentional circulation of petrifying rumours is another "black propaganda" tactic used by Indonesian security forces to cause "trouble, confusion ... and terror" in West Papuan communities,⁷⁸ and thus to maintain psychological control. Scholar Eva-Lotta Hedman writes, "It is clear that political terror in Indonesia involves a politics of suspicion that is at once transparent and occult".⁷⁹ She recounts allegations that *Kopassus* planted the rumour of a Dracula roaming the streets of Jayapura at night in the local newspaper *Cenderawasih Pos* several days before the evening in November 2001 that *Kopassus* troops assassinated West Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay. This Dracula had supposedly already killed two children, and the rumour effectively left Jayapura's streets empty and therefore free of witnesses to Eluay's abduction and subsequent assassination.⁸⁰

The efficacy of the Dracula rumour is described by Hedman thus:

In post-Suharto Indonesia, paranoia has become a distinct kind of political discourse, one in which politicians, military officers, journalists, and reformers equally engage. In this paranoid politics, the Dracula is simultaneously a political metaphor, a political tool, and a political reality. As a political metaphor, the Dracula is used to critique those in power. As a political tool, the Dracula is seemingly employed with the intention to terrorize citizens and shroud political crimes in obscurity; and as a political reality, the Dracula is able to cause social anxiety and empty town streets.⁸¹

⁷⁵ Wenda, email correspondence, 23 May 2011.

⁷⁶ Rumbiak, email correspondence, 22 May 2011.

⁷⁷ Simpson op. cit., p. 8.

⁷⁸ Ibid p. 13.

⁷⁹ Eva-Lotta Hedman, *Conflict, Violence and Displacement within Indonesia*, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca, 2008, p. 286.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

The spreading of rumours such as the Dracula one in Jayapura is a popular PSYOPS technique world-wide. For example, in 1962, as part of their offensive tactics in their conflict with Cuba, the US proposed to spread

the word [in Cuba] that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro [who] was anti-Christ. ... [Then] just over the horizon there would be an American submarine which would surface off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown.⁸²

Finally, the threatening presence of *Kopassus* and other security forces, made known to West Papuans through intimidating and intrusive surveillance, is an aspect of PSYOPS that contributes to the constant oppression of Papuans. Benny Wenda describes how he feels that his “life has been controlled by someone else. Even living in my own land”, he explains, “I always felt that I [was] a slave with my own people in my own land. Because I don’t have any freedom or any right to voice my political belief in my own country”.⁸³

Similarly, Jacob Rumbiak writes: “Psychologically, chronic oppression causes depression and a feeling of powerlessness”.⁸⁴ From the TNI houses that are wedged between Papuan houses in Papuan villages and TNI checkpoints at the entrance to villages, to the strategic placement of terrifying statues of *Kopassus* troops in public places, West Papuans are made to feel the presence of Indonesian security forces in their everyday activities. One of the authors observed during a visit to West Papua in 2008 that Indonesian troops even monitored church services (as depicted in one of the leaked TNI PowerPoint files) and church-provided clinics. Further asserting their presence, the TNI commonly take early morning runs, singing nationalistic songs loudly as they jog (this was observed numerous times by one of the authors in 2008 in West Papua—see Photograph 2, below). This practice is also common in Java, but in West Papua it is particularly disturbing as it serves as a reminder at the beginning of the day of who exercises authority in the public arena in West Papua.

⁸² Elliston op. cit., p. 83

⁸³ Wenda op. cit.

⁸⁴ Rumbiak op. cit.



Photo 1: TNI troops with second-hand clothes brought by a Merauke church to villagers, 2008 (Photo: Camellia Webb-Gannon)



Photo 2: TNI troops singing loudly while jogging past a church in Merauke, 2008 (Photo: Camellia Webb-Gannon)

According to Watson, “crowd-control is probably the most-used psychological counter-insurgency technique. ... The effects of police formations and actions on crowds and the use of special equipment and techniques ... produce desired effects”.⁸⁵ This technique is exercised frequently in West Papua by security forces via “sweeps” of towns and villages searching for “separatist” materials or weapons on politically important West Papuan dates such as December 1st (West Papuan national day),⁸⁶ and the turning out en masse of security forces to incite awe and fear. For example, when in Wamena in 2008, one of the authors was witness to the sudden and unnerving show of approximately 20 open backed police and army vehicles, packed with at least ten troops and officers each, driving around the town with their sirens blaring, then parading before shutting down a West Papuan church-opening ceremony (see Photograph 3). That “the surprise appearance of a large unit of specially equipped police in full view of the mob can have a huge psychological impact”⁸⁷ was confirmed by this author in Wamena when one of the rapidly scattering crowd of celebrators whispered that the security forces shut down the town and cut off roads like this regularly as a drill.

⁸⁵ Watson op. cit., p. 417.

⁸⁶ Haluk op. cit.

⁸⁷ Watson op. cit., p. 418



Photograph 3: Police and Army turn out en masse to shut down a church celebration in Wamena, 2008 (Photo: Camellia Webb-Gannon)

Short and Long Term Effects of PSYOPS

The short-term effects of PSYOPS on West Papuan communities are more easily visible, although the long-term effects are just as detrimental. Torture and politically motivated murder of West Papuans by security forces have both the immediate effect of silencing the victim and the longer-term effect of spreading fear among communities, which forces resistance activities underground and causes psychological distress. Scholar of West Papua, and former director of the Catholic Office of Justice and Peace in Jayapura, Budi Hernawan, has analysed the practice of torture in West Papua. Hernawan draws on Foucault:

Torture [in Papua] is performed as a public event and thus reaches the maximum terrifying impact on the social body. This is the ultimate goal of the public display of the injured body. It is not only to inflict agonizing pain and suffering over the individual but, more importantly, to ensure that the whole social body witnesses

the real power of the sovereign as inscribed over the abject. This message has to be very clear to the public to complete the whole torture ritual.⁸⁸

This public dimension of torture, intended as a message to the West Papuan body politic, is evident in the video-phone recording of several of the recent high-profile torture cases in West Papua, including the brutal cutting open of West Papuan Yawan Wayeni with a bayonet by Brimob in 2009; and the burning of the genitals, hog tying and suffocating (although not to death) of another West Papuan man in 2010. Political warnings have also been sent to the West Papuan public through the kidnapping and sexual assault of Yane Waromi, the daughter of a West Papuan independence figure, Edison Waromi⁸⁹; the 2001 assassination of Theys Eluay by *Kopassus*; the 2009 assassination of Kelly Kwalik by *Brimob* and *Densus 88* police, and the 2001 murder of Willem Onde, an OPM unit leader in Asiki, Merauke, who had also (like Theys Eluay) enjoyed favours from *Kopassus*.

West Papuans believe that the long-term oppression of Papuans through PSYOPS tactics can lead to incapacitation and even death. Two prominent examples illustrate this. The first is the 2011 death of the former chair of the MRP (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*--West Papua's all-Papuan upper house) Agus Alua, which occurred hours after he learned that his reappointment to the second MRP body had been vetoed by Jakarta. Reverend Benny Giay, head of the Kingmi (indigenous West Papuan) church, asserts that the reason Alua was excluded from the new committee by the Government of Indonesia was because of his controversial views, particularly his 2010 call on behalf of the MRP for a referendum on West Papua's status.⁹⁰ Giay believes that the shock of this realisation contributed in no small way to his sudden death, and thus that his death can be read as a "crime against the basic rights of the Papuan people and against their rejection of Special Autonomy".⁹¹ Similarly, the debilitating stroke suffered by John Rumbiak, a brilliant West Papuan human rights advocate, in February 2005, came after he experienced numerous death threats over a period of several years, indicating that the psychological pressure of oppression proved too much to withstand.⁹² This is consistent with torture and trauma expert Benham Behnia's assertion that:

War and torture are extraordinary, uncontrollable, and unpredictable events. The stress caused by these events can exceed the individual's ability to adapt. Victims feel powerless because they have no control over or ability to

⁸⁸ Budi Hernawan, 'Torture in West Papua: A Spectacle of Dialectics - The Sovereign and the Abject', Paper presented at Comprehending West Papua Conference, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, February 2011.

⁸⁹ See Jono van Hest (director), *Pride of Warriors*. Melbourne, 2009: Film produced by Jenny McMahon. Screened by Al Jazeera, 16 February, 2010. Accessed 17 March 2011. Available from <http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/witness/2010/02/2010210182855844350.html>.

⁹⁰ "Benny Giay Shocked By Death of Agus Alua, Calls for MRP Inauguration to Be Postponed", JUBI via *West Papua Media Alerts*, 9 April, 2011. Accessed 25 April, 2011. Available from <http://westpamuedia.info/2011/04/14/benny-giay-shocked-by-death-of-agus-alua-calls-for-mrp-inauguration-to-be-postponed/>

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² James Elmslie, "The John Rumbiak Story" (unpublished manuscript, 2005), Word file.

anticipate the course of events. ... The intentional nature of war and torture makes them particularly distressing, because the survivor's injury is not an accident; it is the direct result of conscious and malicious actions by others.⁹³

Behnia continues, explaining how “extreme situations caused by war and torture also call into question connections, such as kinship, friendship, and the sense of community, that link individuals to each other. Painful breaches of trust by relatives, neighbours and friends can make it difficult for survivors to trust other people and to feel secure in their company”.⁹⁴ Jacob Rumbiak can attest to this, claiming that, “during the 11 years I have lived in Australia, I have been followed by Australian intelligence agents, in co-operation [with] Indonesian intelligence agents, as well as other foreign organisations”.⁹⁵ And Benny Wenda similarly describes how, when he was in West Papua,

Indonesia always followed whatever I [did] and wherever I [went], intimidating, spying on me. Indonesian intelligence [was] always [at] every meeting, church meeting, to always follow you around. If you [were an] activist or leader for your people, you never felt free. Sometimes [we were even] embarrassed ourselves to be Papuan, because we are being watch[ed] all the time.⁹⁶

Conclusion

The leaked TNI documents which we have been analysing, complete with “x’s” targeting the photographed figures of West Papuan independence leaders in some of the dossiers, are shocking not in so much as they offer new revelations about the viciousness of Indonesia’s PSYWAR in West Papua, but, rather, in their revelation of the level of research detail and resources that the TNI dedicates to waging the war. As discussed in the first section of this report, these TNI files constitute the most significant stock-take of OPM/TPN forces ever undertaken, and not surprisingly so given the considerable comparative advantage of resources and freedom of movement enjoyed by Indonesian security in West Papua in relation to indigenous Papuans. The *Anatomy of Separatists* document is chilling in its comprehensiveness, revealing the work of a tightly knit network of Indonesian intelligence agents ranged against a systematically researched (if not always accurate) list of what are considered to be state enemies, including West Papuan church leaders.

Significantly, nearly every important West Papuan leader, civil and military alike, is targeted in this document as an separatist, indicating that if these leaders accurately represent the will of the people they lead, then the majority of the West Papuan body politic is in effect seen by the TNI as being a collective enemy of the state. While this does not bode well for West Papuans

⁹³ Behnam Behnia, “Trust Building from the Perspective of Survivors of War and Torture,” *Social Service Review*, March 2004, p. 27

⁹⁴ *Ibid* p. 27.

⁹⁵ Rumbiak *op. cit.*

⁹⁶ Wenda *op. cit.*

who must live under an Indonesian occupation that perceives them as such, it does add solid evidence to West Papuans' claims against the legitimacy of Indonesia's governance. The short and the long term effects of the PSYOPS tactics are painfully familiar to West Papuans – what is important about these documents having come to light is that they constitute solid proof of TNI intent to oppress and terrorise West Papuans. Markus Haluk has commented that as a West Papuan leader he is constantly under observation ...

day and night. Whe[ther] incoming [or] outgoing, I am always on guard and monitored by the security forces and military who w[ear] civilian clothes. ... They [use] vegetable sellers, shoe sellers, meatballs sellers, watch sellers and other sellers ... [to] continuously come to sell at my residence. Their purpose is only ... to check the existence and activities I do.⁹⁷

How does he feel living under Indonesian occupation? “I feel like [I am] living at the zoo, ... surrounded by lions and tigers [that have a] ferocious hunger for meat, ... Indonesia's Papua[n] ... human flesh. This situation, ... when will it end?”⁹⁸

A recent report by Indonesian human rights watchdog *Imparsial*, titled *Human Rights Implications of the Military Presence in Papua: From the Old Order to the Reform Era*, which is based on “interviews with residents of Papua, officials and high-ranking military officers assigned to the province”, urges

the de-militarization of Papua to be conducted soon because the military approach only brings human rights violations. ... Since the country's so-called reform era, ... human rights conditions in the region had been marked by intimidation, torture and sexual violence.⁹⁹

The executive director of *Imparsial* has contended that “the military presence was serving as a psychological obstacle for Papua's development”, and that it is critical for the sake of peace in West Papua that the 15,000 troops stationed there be reduced. The central Indonesian government needs to shift from less of a focus on “separatists”, to more of a focus on development, according to *Imparsial* researchers.¹⁰⁰

The global community, including governments, politicians, academics, and human rights organisations, has a responsibility to act on this evidence and to mitigate the decades of psychological terror and physical trauma experienced by West Papuan individuals and communities at the hands of Indonesian security forces. A crucial step in this direction would be to end any type of training or funding by Australia of *Kopassus* forces in particular. As recently as September 2010, Australia's elite SAS forces were involved in

⁹⁷ Haluk, Email correspondence, 27 May 2011

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ In Arientha Primanita, “More Talk, Less Military Needed in Papua: Activists,” *The Jakarta Globe*, 1 June 2011. Accessed 2 June 2011. Available from <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/more-talk-less-military-needed-in-papua-activists/444400>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

counterterrorism training with *Kopassus* in Indonesia,¹⁰¹ which the US-based Human Rights Watch says “undermines the push for reform”, as “very few people from *Kopassus* have been investigated, convicted and served appropriate sentences for serious crimes”.¹⁰² If Australia sets the example, then perhaps the United States, which, in 2010, resumed its security aid to *Kopassus* under President Obama after a 12-year moratorium on such assistance, might follow suit. Without the implicit and now explicit backing of regional and world powers, the TNI’s terror stronghold in West Papua would be considerably weakened.

¹⁰¹ Matt Brown, ‘SAS Training with Kopassus Despite Rights Concerns’, *ABC News*, 2010. Accessed 3 June 2011. Available from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/09/28/3023411.htm>.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

This report is dedicated to the memory of Agus Alue Alua. Alua was committed to working for peace with justice in West Papua, serving as the first chairperson of the MRP – the all-Papuan upper house – with a spirit of integrity and collaboration. He died in hospital on April 7, 2011, after learning that the Indonesian government had decided not to reappoint him to the MRP.

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About the West Papua Project

This project seeks to promote peaceful dialogue between the people of West Papua and Indonesia, and to promote conflict resolution as a viable alternative to the current and escalating conflict.

Objectives

- Establish relevant links with concerned NGOs, academics and parliamentarians in Australia, West Papua and Indonesia. The resulting networks will serve as a conduit for the dissemination of public information and as a key source of support for conflict resolution
- Raise public awareness of the conflict between West Papua and Indonesia with particular reference to the human rights implications and the threat to the stability of the South Pacific region.

Project description

This project aims to put in place concrete strategies near achieve the goal of peaceful dialogue between Indonesia and West Papua. These strategies will consist of strengthening networks, addressing the information deficit on West Papua through research and a public awareness campaign, and promoting education on conflict resolution.



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